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Topic: A New International System.

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The prelude to my presentation is the following anecdote.

TEACHER : "Boys, can you give an example of Globalisation?"

Answer : "Yes, Sir. It is Princess Diana!"

Question : "...How???"

An **English** Princess with an **Egyptian** boyfriend crashes in a **French** tunnel driving a **German** car with a **Dutch** engine, which was driven by a **Belgian** driver, who was high on **Scottish** whiskey, followed closely by **Italian** Paparazzi, treated by an **American** doctor, using **Brazilian** medicines.....
And now, **dead !**"

The message is that globalisation cannot any longer be taken for granted. Most politicians and most observers have not fully grasped this and run on auto-pilot ignoring the danger signal blinking on the panel telling that everything is not going according to plan.

This presentation deals first with the model that has worked so well since 1945 but now starts to splutter. The second part discusses globalisation or internationalisation or internationalism – its advantages and some of its shortcomings. The third part sketches a new model forged by new trends gradually feeling its way onto the stage. Finally a few ideas is lined up indicating where the world could go if we let internationalism (in its original or adapted version to new and changed circumstances) slip out of our grasp.

I. INTERNATIONALISM. THE MODEL 1945 to 1995.

We often use globalisation or economic internationalisation in our vocabulary. This choice of words may not be misleading but it is certainly not accurate. Most people are satisfied with the well-known elephant joke saying that I cannot describe an elephant but when seeing one I do recognise it as such! Such a posture is not enough. It gives no clue to what we are talking about. We need to enter the den of the devil however much we prefer not to and take a close and hard look at the mechanics and the details.

For a moment we change the captain's cap for the overall of the chief engineer. The following items are decisive for internationalism to escape the straitjacket of economics as the only or at least the only important skeleton in defining globalisation/internationalisation.

The way we think. Do we think as a nation (inward looking) or do we think as citizens in a broader world (outward looking). What is our horizon?

From where do we get our information and inspiration? National media or international ones?

What goods and services do we purchase? Does the label 'made in x-country' matter?

Where do we work?

Where do we study? At home or abroad?

What about our leisure? Travel, entertainment, holidays?

The mindset provides the litmus test. Do we perceive the world as composed by many entities - nations - confined by borderlines on the map. If so we talk about nationalism. Or do we perceive the world as one large stage. This is internationalism - the way we think and perceive the world.

History tells us that internationalism not only leads to a higher living standard but also a more peaceful world. Nationalism decreases the living standard and increases the risk of major wars. Nation-states blame each other and play the dangerous game of 'beggar thy neighbour'. National pride triggers off rivalry leading to war. Examples of this can be found in European history prior to The First World War (1914 to 1918) and prior to The Second World War (1939 to 1945).

The post 1945 international model operated along three flywheels. National welfare systems made the societies worthwhile to live in for its citizens and worthwhile for them to defend. There was a threat from the Soviet and Russian Empire being an ideological and conventional nationalistic threat at the same time. It was parried by collective defense. Economic internationalization emerged to finance the welfare state and the collective defense by a sustained high growth. These three main elements supported each other. The model was consistent. It worked. It was a phenomenal model for its time.

These three main factors actually interacted in a positive way. The international division of labour increased economic growth. Financial resources became available to shore up the lavish welfare systems. The societies looked even more worthwhile to defend.

How does the system look now? The common enemy has disappeared after the end of the cold war. A new enemy has been found in the name of international terrorism but albeit dangerous and threatening not as terrifying as the Soviet Union. The international division of labour is producing less impressive growth rates. The flows to finance the welfare societies are not so strong and deep as they used to be. The welfare societies have been forced to trim the services. Privatisation is groping its way into the system undermining one of the most fundamental principles of the genuine welfare societies: Everyone is equal. Not only do the three elements not any longer interact positively, they actually act against each other.

The following principles governed the international political and economic environment. The nation-state was the universally adopted - almost sacrosanct - political infrastructure supplemented by a somewhat fragile international framework.

Sovereignty permitted the nation-state to pick and choose domestic policies according to its preferences. In this non-global era domestic legislation ruled without fear of international repercussions. Pursuance of national interests was the mutually agreed yardstick. National ambitions – despite embryonic globalization and despite ideology - were still the dominating issue, explaining and guiding the attitude of the players.

This is not any longer the case. Transnational forces, multinational enterprises and supranational institutions have entered the game. Their presence cannot be reconciled with a fundamentally national oriented model. Almost all the problems and challenges are international in their character and few, if any, can be solved inside an international model neglecting this imperative.

II. CHALLENGE.

For many, maybe the majority around the world, economic globalisation possesses one and only one advantage: Higher growth and higher standard of living. To achieve that they are ready to sacrifice a part of their own cultural identity, taste and original consumer preference, etc. Some observers put it more bluntly saying that they are willing to go to the pawnshop with their soul or part of their soul.

There is a trade-off. At some point the increased materialistic welfare may not any longer be judged sufficient to warrant the loss of identity. This balance may change over time, it may be different for different peoples according to culture, and traditions etc but it is there.

What has been seen during the last 10 years and especially in the aftermath of the financial crisis in East Asia in 1997-1998 is that the large majority of the population joined the economic globalisation because they thought it was unstoppable. Some kind of a ratchet that could only move in one direction – upwards. That was the contract they had signed with the international world and the internationalists. When the harsh realities showed up in the shape of contraction and decreased living standards they felt betrayed. No one told them it could also go the other way!

It seems that internationalism has weathered this storm – at least for the time being. But how many more backlashes can be sustained? And what happens if or when an economic crisis casts its spell over China with a whole generation since 1979 only knowing about double digit or near to double digit growth?

To put it in the prism of balancing growth and identity: What happens if or when global growth falters so that alternative economic models may offer growth comparable with economic globalisation? Can we count upon global support for internationalism? Are the troops onboard the good ship `Internationalism` ready to suffer, make it go straight and dispense with the good life for a change and for a time?

If we dig a little bit deeper we find four specific challenges to internationalism.

1) Dichotomy inside all nation-states between the elite and the majority of population. The elite have chosen internationalism. The elite communicate with the elite in other nation-states but not with the majority of the population in their own nation- state. The majority gets more and more introvert and partly nationalistic.

Funny enough we stumble upon a double seclusion. The two groups inside the same nations-state do not communicate with each other. They communicate and hook on to comparable social layers (social strata) in other nation-states. This double seclusion signifies sociological break up of the nation-state. The elite does not any longer demonstrate true leadership. The majority of the population lacking guidance and risks slides into some state of spineless even flabby posture.

2) Disparities - inside the nation-states and between nation-states.

- economically and socially. In 1820 the ratio (GNP per capita) between the richest and poorest nation was 3:1, in 1913 it had deteriorated to 11:1, in 1950 it was 31:1, in 1973 the figure was 44:1 and in 1992 it was 72:1.
- digital divide which we now start to talk about. Who has access to the internet?
- educationally. Who gets the education to perform in the new international and then by implication also more competitive society?

All factors point to a dangerous split where a small part of the population is: Rich, well educated, uses the internet and communicates internationally.

While the majority of the population is: Not so rich and in many cases outright poor, poorly educated, not using the internet and communicates domestically inside nation-states.

These disparities produce one mind set for the elite and another one for the majority of the population.

3) Minorities inside nations-states were kept quiet until the 1980's. Now they insist on voicing their opinion and being listened to.

The European Union has broadly speaking not solved this problem but prevented it from erupting into what would have been a very nasty in-fight between the nation-state and its minorities by developing a model based upon Economic Internationalisation and Cultural Decentralisation.

The virtue of this model is that it opens the door for participation in the international economy for the regions inside nation-states without first making a low bow for the centralising government in the nation-state. Formerly - to use France as an example but many other European nation-states qualify - a French region had to pay allegiance to Paris and the French government to achieve a slice of the cake accruing from the international economy. Without this subservient attitude the central government would see to it that foreign direct investment and other goodies offered by the international economy were directed towards other regions. And the government could do it because it had exclusive rights to negotiate internationally. The equation was quite simple: The majority inside the nation-states constituted the ruling class and clamoured for their culture to be consecrated as THE national culture. The minorities yielded to that demand. They could not afford to let the benefits of the international division of labour slip by giving priority to their own identity and culture. Industrialization and the nation-state taking control over the European political and cultural life for two centuries pulled the trigger to see the withering away of regional

cultures despite their rich contribution to European culture for several hundred years. Diversification and heterogeneity was bypassed by the drive for one and only one national culture regardless of ethnicity, religion and regionalism. Fortunately it was bypassed but not run over.

But now the nation-state itself is withering away because its ultimate weapon – barring the way to the international economy – has been wrested away from it by the European Union. The prerogative to negotiate internationally has been transferred from the nation-state to the EU. This weakening of the nation-state has allowed the regional and local cultures to escape from their hibernation. And they have done so in magnificent style.

The key observation following for this analysis is that the minorities raise their heads thus assuming a role in the forces recasting the system.

The genuine revelation was that the EU model pre-empted what many expected to be inevitable after the falling apart of the Soviet and Russian Empire in 1990: An ugly spectre of civil wars and majorities against minorities with some mobilising support from adjacent nation-states. From Estonia in the north to Slovenia in the south, we find approximately ten nation-states but more than 25 ethnicities and a large number of religious beliefs woven into each other but not following nor respecting political borders.

All ingredients were present to trigger conflicts and confrontations that ultimately might have made what happened in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990's look like a picnic.

It did not happen. The EU was able to relate a very simple message. If you want to join the EU and they all did as was shown in December 2002 when negotiations to that effect were finalised, you need to respect human rights and the rights of the minorities. Much to the surprise of all the Cassandras having already predicted some kind of chaos they dressed the ranks. Once more the simple idea of economic internationalization and cultural decentralisation proved to be the key for propitious political and economic engineering in Europe.

4) A sinister triangle takes advantage of economic globalisation to pursue objectives in flagrant contradiction to internationalism.

- International terrorism
- International crime
- Infectious diseases

They may be more international than many of the well-known international forces. They abuse internationalism by distorting the rules to their own advantage contradicting the very purpose of internationalism. In fact they create what can be termed parallel societies operating like a cancer cell threatening the survival of the body. They force internationalism to defend itself and by so doing jeopardise the very future of internationalism.

To avoid them from taking control the international community is being propelled into implementing rules contrary to internationalism. Anti-terror activities consist primarily of better intelligence which may infringe on individual freedom to travel and gather information. Efforts against international crime fret the international financial system. Both terrorism and crime force the nation-states and the international community to build up a network of controls and impediments to the free movement of goods and services that with luck 'only' increases cost but actually may trip up international economic transactions. Resources that might have been better used for other purposes are channelled into control and command functions to contain international terrorism and international crime.

Infectious diseases have a similar effect, albeit they are not born out of abuse and distortion. However, the very fact remains that protection against the fast and sometimes deadly spread of infectious diseases the nation-states and the international community may introduce measures increasing costs and making normal international transactions tiresome and more burdensome, in some cases outright impossible. The impact of SARS on the economies of East Asia in spring 2003 is a reminder of this. SARS had a limited effect with a number of dead below 1000 people compared to what was called the Spanish Flu just after The First World War with approx. 20 million fatal victims.

This point to a worrying conclusion: Some 'internationalists' play the game while pretending to follow the rules. Their agenda is not only different. It is hidden.

III. NEW PLAYERS.

We may dig a little bit deeper to peep into who actually voices less enthusiasm, scepticism or even opposition to internationalism. Doing this we bump into new actors on the international arena not necessarily working against or moderating internationalism but by their very presence complicating the game.

The nation-state has put its stamp upon world politics, but seen in a historical perspective it is only 200 years' old and nothing guarantees that it continues to be the main player. In fact the trend is against and not for the nation-state. To supplement and in many cases replace the nation-state as the soloist in the international concert, we discover a whole new string of more or less visible players all fine-tuning their instruments.

1) Politicians in some developing nations.

Politicians in some developing or newly industrial nations have often flirted with an alternative model but never really broken with internationalism. However their often voiced displeasure serves as a reminder may be even warning that the point of balance is not a theoretical question for them, their nations and their populations. A situation where they may reverse priorities to skip internationalism and introduce a more national – not necessarily nationalistic – course is thinkable.

Nations like Malaysia, India, Brazil and not forgetting China to mention a few, have not swallowed whole the prescription offered by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). They have been choosy over international medicine. By adopting this posture they have given proof that economic growth is not conditioned upon selecting from the international menu only. To paraphrase a well-known politician: They may be smokers but they do not always inhale.

2) Politicians in some developed nations.

The same can be said about politicians in some developed nations. Prime Minister Berlusconi has tempered Italy's hitherto strong support for the European integration. The same signal, albeit in different editions, are coming out from France and Germany. Russia may also be found in this category.

The message is the same as picked up from some of the developing or newly industrialised nations: Internationalism may be good but not necessarily the only model and a small dose of nationalism may do us good.

The problem is of course that a small dose of nationalism is OK but having tried it you may become addicted!

3) Civic society.

The civic society or the pressure groups have seen and in many cases before national politicians the advantage of going international and use international fora and/or media to get their message through. Just to mention a few: Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Greenpeace, Attac.

The political consumer is a new kid in the kindergarten taking part in the game of dice to influence how internationalism works. The consumer builds into his/her preferences ethics, norms, values indeed political choices not only based upon well-known choices such as environmentally friendly but outright politics indeed foreign policy i.e. boycott of a nation-state being governed by a regime anathema to the consumer in question.

4) The Political Enterprise.

The enterprises, and in particular the colossal multinational enterprises play a role in international economics and international politics. They cannot be neglected. And they cannot reject shouldering some part of the political burden/responsibility. It matters what Shell, Microsoft, Toyota think and does with regard to international politics. They have become part of the selected group occupying the seat as trendsetters not only in the commercial sense of this word but indeed bringing their ethics into global play.

Illustrations: General Motors have sales higher than the national income of Norway. Mitsubishi has sales larger than the national income of Poland. Shell has sales larger than the national income of Greece

5) Cross Border Regions.

This embodies regions inside a nation-state being drawn towards a closer co-operation with regions inside an adjacent nation-state than regions inside the nation-state to which it politically belongs. It starts to break out of its nation-state or at least giving the policies pursued by that particular nation-state less weight.

Examples: In Europe: Both sides of the Rhine and the Baltic area. In US: From Vancouver to the North Western part of Mexico. In Asia: Singapore and Johore and Riau.

6) Regions inside a nation-state.

Many regions do not want the nation-state to take care of their participation in the international economy. Look at the states inside e.g. Germany or the Australian states. They do not only compete with other states and other nation-states but also with the nation-state it forms part of. In USA several states have adopted legal acts bearing upon foreign policy i.a. boycott of a country.

7) Coalitions of the Willing.

If the international community fails to take action powerful nation-states may join to act themselves.

Foreign- and security policy illustrations: Former Yugoslavia. Iraq.
Economic policy: Debt relief and other financial assistance for selected countries.

8) Blue-collar workers in the developed nations.

It has long been known, seen and felt that the blue collar force in the developed nations was living under the spell of losing jobs because of a mismatch – seen from their perspective – of productivity and wages compared with developing or newly industrialised nations.

This phenomenon in the wake of economic globalisation has been dealt with. Even if the workforce sometimes felt it unreasonably it was comparable to losing jobs to other parts of their own country.

The scepticism or resistance to economic globalisation has always surfaced in this social strata of developed nations but never having sufficient clout to enforce a non-globalisation policy or protectionist policy.

9) White collar workers, highly skilled threatened by outsourcing.

What is new is the repercussion of economic globalisation on the white-collar workforce. The highly skilled, well-educated part of the workforce sometimes even in the managerial or research brackets have become victims of globalisation.

In the developed nations the debate about this new animal in the zoo goes under the label of outsourcing but it is in fact nothing new. It is firmly inside the concept of the international distribution of labour.

But and this is the important but. The overwhelming part of the white-collar workforce has never been in the firing line themselves. They have been exempt from the negative consequences of globalisation. They have seen some of the blue-collar workforce wriggle under the onslaught of globalisation while they themselves enjoyed the lower prices in WalMart – for them it has been sunny all the way.

Not anymore. Outsourcing in its modern edition hits this social class and hard. Various analysis and prognosis forwarded by think tanks and institutes around the world shows clearly enough – on top of anecdotal evidence – that this bracket of society is going to live under changed, very much changed conditions.

And that constitutes a potential threat against globalisation because they are far better educated, far better to articulate their views and in possession of far more political power.

In short: Suddenly being hit by globalisation instead of benefiting from it they form one of the most dangerous pressure groups to emerge with adequate power to influence politics in the years to come.

The key observation is that, most if not all, of the new main players operate outside and not inside the system. The implication is that the system or the behaviour of the players has to adjust. It is more likely that the players will impose their will on the system than the other way around.

IV. A NEW MODEL FOR INTERNATIONALISM.

The new model is borne in wedlock with internationalism as the father and the nation-states lost monopoly on use of weapons including weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as the mother!

Internationalism has undoubtedly been accompanied by and to a large extent been responsible for a tremendous and unprecedented rise in materialistic wealth around the globe. At the same time it has produced a strange kind of symbiosis among nation-states. No nation-state can go it alone anymore. Autarky has been confined to the graveyard. Even the USA as the almighty imperial power is dependent on the rest of world. This mutual dependency has as its twin a degree of instability. In the eyes of an economist the system is not any longer stable but groping its way towards a new and unknown equilibrium. Misfits, misunderstandings and abuses may thwart the system, thus allowing unwanted and/or unexpected elements to enter – just like a virus may enter a computer and produce the dreaded sign ‘error’ on the screen.

In the ‘old’ world the nation-states basked in the sign of Mars having a monopoly on production and use of weapons including WMD. They played according to well-known and observed rules. The newcomers in possession of threatening arsenals do

not follow this pattern. They have their own rules and for some of them these rules call for the destruction of our world.

And internationalism has produced a fragile and vulnerable world where key centres not adequately protected invite attackers. If some of these centres be it in politics, economics, business or technology are put out of operation our nation-states and the communities they protect and shelter may not fall apart as the attacker wish. They are still too robust, but they may not any longer assume the uncontested and universally accepted role as framework for the relations between the ruling elite and the majority of the population. The majority may start to lose confidence in the ruling elite thus undermining its legitimacy. The coherence, trust, confidence being the glue keeping the nation-state and the domestic communities together may dissolve triggering off a social melt down on the wish list of the anti-internationalist, disruptive and destructive forces.

This is all the more serious because our world albeit international still leans heavily, yes, exclusively on the strategic thinking associated with the former national inspired world. The key strategic thinker is the Prussian von Clausewitz whose thesis had shown a remarkable, admirable but now dangerous intellectual virility for more than 200 years!

Von Clausewitz tells us two things. War is a continuation of politics with other instruments. In war ultimately all means are brought into action.

These two theses operated let us call it well enough in a national inspired world. But they spell the death warrant for an international world – internationalism.

How can we outlive von Clausewitz' thesis about war as continuation of politics in an interdependent world where all nation-states and all communities interact to ensure a smooth functioning of the whole international community as a precondition for their own development?

How can we outlive the thesis if or when some of the players do not act according to well defined rules about achieving benefits after having won a war but is actually going for the jugular of the international community wishing to destroy it?

The conclusion is regrettably crystal clear. The strategic thinking offered by von Clausewitz cannot be reconciled with an international world. The imperative of internationalism and consequently the alternative to von Clausewitz is to focus on models for co-operation instead of confrontation, conflicts and ultimately war. So far the strategists have not turned up at this sand table but are content to play at the old and outdated one.

These challenges and changes engender a new kind of internationalism founded on three key principles, each one speaking for itself but coupled together in a comprehensive model: Interventionism, institutionalization, common set-of-values.

Briefly sketched it looks like this. Globalization heralds a situation where actions and/or policies of one single nation-state may threaten the very survival of other nation-states and/or the international community. Unless actions are put in motion to

force a change of policies upon the nation-state in question, the international system unravels as self-interest is paying off. In self defense the international community may even take the hitherto unprecedented step to intervene inside the borders of a nation-state against its will, thus violating sovereignty now appearing as an empty shell. To rally the overwhelming part of the international community decisions to intervene must follow a pattern of transparency and accountability, just like the national political system. Otherwise the world ends up with interventions, yes, but carried out by the strongest power(s) – or coalitions of powers – nursing the root of suspicion that the objective is not safeguard of the international community but to feather one's own nest. A more or less agreed set of values specifying what kind of misbehaviour warrant interventionism, in particular use, of armed forces, becomes the third, last and indispensable step in this new model. Also the most difficult to come to terms with.

1) A set of values (ethics), respect and responsibility.

Some people speak of Monoculture. I do not. My level of ambition is more modest to wit a common set of values which tells us how to react, how to judge, how to assess, what is right and what is wrong?

- More responsibility.
- More respect.
- More tolerance.
- No double standards.

In more specific terms we can outline some events judged by the international community to break step to the extent that action from the international community is legitimate, even called for:

- Genocide
- Weapons of Mass Destruction possessed by rogue states or risk thereof
- Certain kinds of violation of human rights
- Ecological disasters

A viable international system worthwhile to defend for those inside the system and worthwhile to join for those outside, should be built upon three key concepts:

- a) Self-discipline or self-restraint exercised by the powerful actors in politics, economics or business.
- b) Tolerance toward others and their set of values giving prominence to of the need to shape a consensus for most, if not all, major issues even if the major player could force its preference through.
- c) Mutual respect and no double standards banning contemptuous, disdainful or scornful attitudes making room for other opinions even they run counters to the posture adopted by the powerful actors.

Restraint and self-discipline are called for because the stronger, more powerful and economically dominating a nation-state is, the more its behaviour radiates outside its own borders exercising a controlling impact on other nation-states. Exactly the same

goes for the large multinational companies. Their decisions influence the daily life of ordinary people far away, offering those people little or no opportunities to raise their voice and state their case.

If decision-makers do not realize this but drive in the one lane, one direction tunnel designed to suit their interests only the international system will work in a lop-sided way producing inequalities and harmful political and economic environments alienating people from the outside world.

Tolerance is not to open the floodgates for everybody to behave as they like. Tolerance constitutes the right to think and act differently from other people but within a mutually agreed framework. Tolerance defined in this way forces us to know precisely where we stand ourselves. Other opinions must be measured against our own opinion. We must know what we think and why we think in the way we do – what is our mindset and why do we have it and why do we think it is the right one for us? Thinking in this way opens the door for realizing that, what is best for us may not necessarily be best for others. And that gives birth to the crucial observation that the heart of tolerance is that, we care for other people's destiny even if we do not agree with them.

Understanding is the key to tolerance and the key to understanding how other peoples think and why it may be different from the way we think is communication. Unless we communicate and try to understand each other, there is no hope of comparing different ways of thinking with the ultimate objective of shaping a set of values to serve as the mutually agreed framework without which tolerance becomes a beautiful but empty shell. And without striving for that objective there is not much hope for internationalism.

Mutual respect constitutes the unseen ties making a community or a nation tick together. It requires a common set of values. Nationally a common set of values keeps the nation together, and if mutually agreed upon, and applied successfully produces a solid even robust nation-state. A common mindset presents an almost insurmountable obstacle to fragmentation, disintegration and disorganisation. By upbringing and tradition, people react according to some kind of common denominator defined by the underlying set of values.

The question remains whether the world is prepared to introduce a set of values on the international level to safeguard the identity of people irrespective of ethnicity and/or religion neglecting nationality as criterion for rights and obligations?

The first and indispensable step is to reject any kind of double standards. An international system in the true sense of that word must be based upon and reflect equitable rights and obligations. Equal to the law is not only a nice sentence nationally but must also apply for the international system – otherwise it is not equitable and if it is not equitable, how can we expect it to be attractive for all nations, all races and all religions.

There is an iron lining to this silver plate. If an international model congruous with the principles mentioned above emerges, those not wishing to participate can choose to stay outside – and such a choice should be respected.

However, they cannot choose to attack, to disrupt or even trying to dismantle by violent means the international system chosen and built by others just because it does not reflect a set of values preferred by them. The justification of violence and destruction is very rarely supported by the large majority of members of the same culture, ethnicity and religion – far from it. Violence is contradictory to and not in conformity with the teachings of all major religions.

The model should respect the rights of the minorities and prevent the majority from imposing its will on those having chosen to stand aside. But the mirror casts its spell in two directions. No minority can arrogate to itself the right to prevent the majority from living in peace and stability inside a cultural framework chosen by them and for them.

If minorities and/or groups of minorities by acts of violence seek to destroy wealth, undermine economic and social stability, engineer cultural upheavals such violence has to be resisted and if necessary by force. It then becomes a question of defence of the trend making seen for centuries toward a more civilized mankind. War, terror and fear have gradually been replaced by negotiations, civility and a genuine rule of the law.

No country, no nation, no culture, no civilization, no religious or ethnic group has the right per se to use power be it politically, economically, militarily or culturally. The use of power must be justified by being weighed, measured and judged against the principles outlined earlier and the right to do so must be earned by self-discipline, self-restraint, respect and no double standards.

2) International interventionism.

If or when the set of values hopefully emerging on international level is challenged the international community will react. That can be done in many ways.

- persuasion
- pressure on top of persuasion e.g. saying unpleasant things about what will happen
- economic measures
- isolation
- security and that is military actions.

All this is not new. It has been used and tried before.

What is new is that it will be done on the basis of an internationally agreed set of values. What is even more new and more important is that the international community reserves for itself the right to defend itself against those threatening its existence/function.

Interventionism.

Economic intervention. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has steadfastly, without hesitation or the slightest doubt intervened in national economic policies with the consent of its board. The protagonists expounded it as (self) defense of the international economy against disrupting forces. The critics have labelled that posture hypocrisy.

There is growing discontent that interventions are controlled by the creditors shifting the burden of adjustment squarely on to the debtors. Already in 1945 John Maynard Keynes foresaw this risk. He tried – in vain – to forge IMF in a balanced way, opening the door for stimulating policies in creditor countries as well as restrictive policies in debtor countries. The debtor countries have certainly felt the heavy hand of the IMF but not much daring has been shown to force international responsibility on creditor countries.

The need for economic interventionism may be more acute than ever in the beginning of 2004. The US economy with about 25% of global gross national product is haunted by historically unprecedented debt burdens auguring a day of reckoning not far away. The much welcomed recovery stands on a crumpling mountain of debt. Behind the veil a seminal shift in purchasing power between the established economic powers – mainly the US – and the fast approaching new economic superpowers – mainly China and India - is taking place unfortunately without very many pondering upon the impact on the world economic system.

Military intervention. Contrary to the preceding decades the 1990's stands forth as an era of international interventionism. Security policies were not swept under the carpet as an objective. Military instruments were openly brought into play. But neither objectives nor instruments were regularly inscribed in an orderly international decision-making process. Ad Hoc'ry was the order of the day.

The first Gulf War, Kosovo, Bosnia, East Timor and Somalia illustrate that before 1990 and the end of the cold war it would have been deemed totally unthinkable.

An interesting example took place in the beginning of year 2000 when the European Union intervened in negotiations inside Austria to form a new government referring to the obligations in the preamble of the Treaty of Rome. The EU felt that the Austrian Freedom Party being invited to join the government called these principles into question.

A close examination of the Iraq crisis shows that there was consensus among all major international actors that it was justified to take measures against Iraq, that the international community had the right to contest the Iraqi regime, that a whole string of measures could and should apply including, if necessary, military action.

The disagreement can be boiled down to one, albeit crucial factor whether it was justified to use force here and now.

The Iraq crisis demonstrates how far and how fast the international community has moved toward legitimizing intervention. And not the other way around.

3) Institutionalisation.

An international political system and/or an international model for decision making is emerging.

For a start, let us examine the nation-state, sovereignty and decision-making.

The Nation-State.

The nation-state has been THE political entity for a couple of hundred years. It is the twin of the industrial age providing the political and technical (transport, power, etc.) infrastructure for transforming a country from agriculture to industry. It was and still is the main actor in the international power play. At the present juncture of history its disadvantages outweigh its performance level. It is often too large for questions of prime importance for the individual citizen, while at the same time, too small for global political and economic problems. It blurs the distinction between cultural identity (ethnicity, religion) and nationality (follow the flag). It is on a different level of the curve over political development in Europe, Asia and North America.

Many Europeans do not herald the EU as the problem grinder it undoubtedly is but as an irritant in their daily life. Despite tireless and tedious efforts a line has not yet been drawn between what belongs to the competence of local authorities, regions, nation-state and the Union itself. Most Europeans indeed an overwhelming majority even in Euro-sceptical countries like Denmark would not question Union competence in international economic, monetary and trade problems. They realize that their own nation-state has been outgunned in this game by the colossal sums of international trade and capital movements. However, they backpedal when the Union is casting its eyes on subjects like the shape of cucumbers even if subsequently good reasons are offered and/or it being exposed as rumours without foundation. The Europeans have re-invented the principle of subsidiarity introducing some kind of division of competences between the various levels of power. Unfortunately that only make it worse as such equilibristic manoeuvres with the tongue alienate ordinary European citizens – they never get to the substance. The nation-state is caught between the devil and the deep sea not being fully able to defend its prerogatives nor to volunteer solutions to the problems faced by its citizens.

The minorities inside the Western European nation-states accepted the cultural imperialism exercised by the majority because the nation-state was the key to participation in the international division of labour. It was a quid pro quo. The minorities got their share of the spoils flowing from economic globalisation and they rallied grudgingly but rally they did to support the culture of the majority as the national culture.

The EU changed all that. And for good measure. The EU removed the nation-state as the gatekeeper to the international economy. Most economic legislation was moved from the capital of the nation-state to EU. When that happened the minorities withheld their acceptance of the national culture and resuscitated their own cultural identity.

For the last decade Western Europe has seen a strong revival of Catalonia, Lombardy, Scotland, Bavaria just to mention a few of the old European household names. Not any more. They asked for their pound of flesh and that is taking away the cultural yoke imposed upon them by the majority governing nation-states such as Spain, Italy, UK, Germany most of which have little or no genuine foundation in Europe's political History.

The European Union saved Western Europe from what might have been an ugly clash between the minorities and majorities inside the Western European nation-states. And the European Union prevented a similar calamity from taking place in Central- and Eastern Europe after 1989 by forcing upon the majorities in these newborn nation-states the commitment to respect human rights and especially the right of the minorities as *conditio sine qua non* for entering the European Union.

This European model can be described by Economic Internationalisation and Cultural Decentralisation managing to distribute the benefits of the internal division of labour among the peoples of the nation-state while at the same time granting the minorities the right to flag their own cultural identity regardless of whether, yes or no, it was in conformity with the one adopted by the majority.

Hence the weakening of the nation-state in Europe. Some people contest this but compare the number of legislative acts passed by the Institutions of the European Union respectively the individual nation-states in areas such as industry, trade, agriculture now and 25 years' ago.

The nation-state was invented in Europe as was the industrial age. The two fits like a glove. Precisely at the moment when the industrial age is on its way out so is the nation-state. Europe is actually forging a new and own political and economic architecture with a limited role for the nation-state. Even its prerogative to strike currency, to form an army and run its own judicial system is slipping away.

That is not the case in Asia. The nation-state in Asia is the defender of the minorities against the majority. Without the nation-state in Asia the minorities would be exposed to the potential wrath of the majorities.

In Asia the nation-state is an indispensable condition for holding back the majority from exercising its power and the nation-states become some kind of tool for promoting an Asian equivalent of democracy and human rights.

In North America the power of the United States of America is simply overwhelming. And you may well ask the question whether the US is a nation-state or not. At least if the traditional and original European nation-state is used as yardstick.

Compared to Europe and Asia we do not find many similarities between the corroded nation-state in Europe and the radiant nation-state in Asia.

Sovereignty.

The leading politicians in Europe have acquiesced in the diminishing role of the nation-state. They made their choice. They could choose to transfer political power to

the European level (international level) thus maintaining some but not all of their power. Or they could choose to deny the impotency of the nation-state by clinging to symbols of power learning the hard way that symbols carry little value in the power play. They have all with Switzerland, Norway and Iceland as exceptions chosen the first option.

It is a misunderstanding and regrettably a common misunderstanding that the members of the European Union have abandoned some of their sovereignty by joining the union. This is not correct. They have transferred some of their sovereignty to exercise it in common with adjacent nation-states pursuing analogous policies.

They have realised two core notions and implemented them in actual politics. Power is not confined to one level. It can be exercised at various levels and simultaneously. Power is not stationary confined to its original box. Depending upon how and with whom you exercise it available power can swell and be enhanced.

And they have rejected the old and worn out interpretation of sovereignty. Formerly sovereignty existed and worked. It was the nation-states defense at the geographic border against intruders being it militarily, economic or cultural saying that those who want to operate inside our borders need to respect our rules. And if not willing to do that, stay away.

In the international world this attitude is gone with the wind. The intruders are not any longer a threat but enriching the national society. If they go elsewhere they impoverish the nation-state in question to augment the wealth of competing nation-states. Reluctant and declining nation-states are relegated to play in division two.

In a global world a nation-state has no or at most limited room for manoeuvre to introduce and implement legislation running counter to the path chosen by adjacent countries and the international community. It may do so and some have tried to watch international investors shy away from them to steer trade and investment flows towards other recipients.

To safeguard the domestic policies preferred by a nation-state national legislation must match international rules and/or an international environment. In case of contradiction two options obtrude themselves upon policy makers: Either to change the international framework by negotiation or to abandon the proposed national legislation. To carry the legislation through none the less is not commendable.

We may speak of a new kind of sovereignty. It is defined as the room for manoeuvre achieved by the nation-state to introduce national legislation in conformity with and not in contradiction to international rules and international norms. The more spacious room for manoeuvre achieved the more sovereignty encroached on – sovereignty understood as ability to implement national legislation in a global world.

It is an outside edge. Formerly a nation-state protected itself by national legislation raising conditions for the outside world to operate inside its borders. Now a nation-state initiates international legislation opening the door for subsequent national legislation not risking international legal confrontation.

It is not any longer a question of the nation-state and its borders. It is a question of our society and latitude available to shape our own society reflecting our own political preferences. Sovereignty is not any longer defensive and is not any longer a question of imposing rules, restrictions and conditions on foreign intruders. It is a question of offensive diplomacy, political canvassing, and manoeuvres on the international stage to safeguard your own interest by influencing the international system.

Another word than sovereignty may be called for to reflect that shift.

Decision making.

International decision making is actually working on two premises. One is unanimity. The other one is the threat of the powerful nation-states to take the law into their own hand.

Unanimity is often regarded as the small nation-states saviour. This is not the case. It works the other way round. The reason is that unanimity compels the nation-state to choose between clear cut approving or rejecting, ruling out what is normally regarded as the art of politics: Seeking a compromise. The powerful nation-states hide behind the sometimes intransigent attitude of others and smaller nation-states to escape negotiations. They simply use unanimity as a cloak. Unilateral actions or shaping coalitions of the willing are preferable to the laborious, tedious, exhausting and frequently unrewarding hunt for mutually agreeable solutions. And that opportunity is available for the powerful nation-states, not for the smaller ones.

The European Union offers an interesting experience. During its 46 years of existence (54 if you count from the European Coal and Steel Community) the EU has taken the high road from unanimity on most issues to qualified majority voting on all except a very few and carefully selected topics.

Whether you are for or against this piece of engineering in international politics it has had two remarkable effects.

Firstly, all member states have been smoked out of their position from repeating platitudes to speak in earnest. Knowing that their vote could be dispensable even expendable a recalcitrant mood did not carry much water. They were better served taking a seat at the negotiation table clarifying their position, offer concessions and ask for something in return.

The art of political compromise, political negotiations have been elevated to the international level. For the first time in political history, it reflects a degree of enviable political maturity.

It has become gradually - may be grudgingly so - good behaviour to seek unanimity even if a majority backed solution was at hand at an earlier stage exactly because a compromise making allowance for the interests of all member states and unanimously agreed was preferable to a clinical qualified majority voted decision leaving some of the members out in the cold. The connecting thread in all this is to push everybody to the negotiation table to negotiate – what else?

Secondly, having negotiated a solution and having voted, yes, the member states feel themselves as stakeholders, sharing the responsibility and shouldering the burden of making it work. The compromise reflects that the preoccupation of everybody has been considered and normally incorporated in the final text.

It has not been forced down their throats. They do not arrive at home to explain why they blocked or why they in the end had to give in sometimes losing some of their pride in the process.

And it has forced them to the painful but sometimes propitious process of making up your mind about your own priorities. If you cannot get everything you need to find out what you want and what you can let go.

The decision making equation must make the small and the large nation-states at ease – both of them. The balance to strike unmarks a somewhat larger influence for the smaller nation-states than follows from objective criteria such as GNP per capita, population size, etc. while at the same time opening the door for the larger nation-states to lead but not to command. There is no incentive for the smaller nation-states to participate unless they get something in return for joining and that something must be stronger influence inside than outside. The larger nation-states will not allow the traditional and inevitably inward looking let us just call it responsibility adversity in the smaller nation-states to prevent them from operating internationally exercising leadership.

At the end of the day the heart of the matter is: Mutual Trust. And that leads us back to the question of political negotiations, compromise and political maturity. You are on the same side of the net and not playing against each other.

Unless all nation-states feel that legitimate problems which they bring to the attention of the others will be taken seriously and dealt with in the spirit of mutual accommodation any international system will start to crack.

The key to success is to forge a system where everybody feels that they are better off inside than outside.

V. Conclusion.

In the present stage of affairs we may choose to disregard all this. We may choose to say that everything is wonderful or that everything is awful.

That will surely guide us towards some kind of dismantling of internationalism at least in the present form. Only an optimist can hope that the model under severe stress as highlighted by recent events in international security issues, economic questions and trade problems can roll on.

There are several alternative models. A reinstatement of the nation-state. Clash among civilisations. A kind of three blocks with North America, Asia or may be North Eastern Asia and Europe organising tutelage over what they regard as their part of the world. Or what is unfortunately much more likely some kind of chaos with self service opening the door for the predators in the jungle to prevail.

Such a roll back of internationalism does not commend itself to us.

Instead, we invite the stakeholders in the international community to take the bull by the horns and start to adapt the system to ensure its survival.

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